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Abstract— Current Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems
support only two-party systems, involving the package server and
purchaser. However, for a scalable business model of transacting
digital assets, a multi-party DRM system is often necessary
which involves more than one distributors, who can promote
and distribute the content in regions unknown to the package
server. We propose a key management scheme for a DRM
system that involves more than one distributors with the DRM
client’s flexibility of choosing a distributor according to his own
preference. For instance, a mobile DRM client may contact to a
distribution server who is nearest to him by location or who offers
promotions/discounts on the price or offers more commissions.
In our scheme, the package server does not trust the distribution
servers or the license server. The encrypted digital content sent
by a package server can only be decrypted by the DRM client
who has a valid license and is protected from attacks by other
parties/servers in the system. Moreover, we use Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE) that incurs less computation cost and storage
as certificate managements are not necessary and certificate
verifications are no longer needed. These features make our DRM
system suitable for more effective business models/applications
with the flexibility in deciding a wide range of business strategies
as compared to the existing works.
Index Terms— DRM, key management, content protection, secu-
rity.
I. INTRODUCTION
DRM system is an important component of a digital asset
management system, which manages the rights of the indi-
viduals involved in the creation and transaction of digital
assets. The consumer purchases a digital license granting
certain rights to him instead of buying the digital content.
The content access is regulated with the help of license
that contains permissions, constraints and content decryption
keys. Permissions correspond to actions that can be performed
on the contents, e.g. play, copy, edit, reuse and redistribute.
Constraints are limitations associated with the permissions
in the license, e.g. frequency of access and expiration date.
Content decryption keys are used to decrypt encrypted contents
and are available for a particular permission only if all the
constraints associated with that permission are satisfied. For
instance, suppose a license is issued with ‘play’ permission
with constraints of 10 counts and validity of 30 days. The
decryption key will be unavailable for play after 30 days even
if less than 10 counts are used. These usage rules are often
combined to enforce certain business models, such as rental
or subscription, try-before-buy, pay-per-use and so forth.
Current DRM systems are mainly used for online music
services, eBook publishing on PC-based platforms, games etc.
With the widespread use of the Internet and improvements
in streaming media and compression technology, DRM so-
lutions found appealing applications in e-health to protect
patients privacy. For example, it may be the case that doctors,
pharmacists and nurses are required to have different rights
to access and modify patients personal medical information
over open network. Also in an online learning and infor-
mation environment, a flexible and effective DRM solution
facilitates trade and exchange of learning objects between
universities/institutions on a free or fee basis by managing the
creation, retrieval, trading and distribution of online learning
objects and supporting collaborative development. A DRM
system can also be used within a corporation to guarantee
that only authorized people can access certain information
and prevent employees from disclosing critical and proprietary
information to the company’s competitors.
Various DRM systems have been proposed for digital con-
tent and license distribution for a typical two-party scenario,
where the owner and the consumer are the only parties
involved in the system [20], [4], [23], [13], [7]. However,
two-party DRM systems do not provide business scalability
and unable to make proper business strategies. The DRM
architectures in multi-party multi-level setup are addressed
in [16], [21], [25], [33], [26]. Due to vulnerabilities, most
of the DRM systems are not protected against the attacks.
For instance, the solution presented in [16] assumes the
distribution servers to be trusted by the owner and hence
distributors can posses content keys. This is a shortcoming of
the scheme as finding a large number of trusted distributors is
very difficult. Authenticated key management and scalability
are major concerns in multi-party multi-level DRM system.
Trade-off between flexibility and security in DRM system is
discussed in [12].
This article addresses the problem of designing a DRM
architecture enabling proper business strategies for different
regions and cultures, and designing an efficient and secure key
management in this system. Our key management mechanism
enjoys several interesting features as compared to the existing
works. We summarise below our contributions in this paper
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and their advantages over the existing approaches:
1) We design a DRM system which is flexible to more
innovative and scalable business model considering a network
with multi-distributors instead of single-distributor. A local
distributor can better explore potentially unknown market to
the owner (package server) and make strategies according
to the market. In addition, the distributors can also help
in handling different price structure of media in different
countries, and share with the owner any information on price
or demand fluctuation cost. In our DRM system, the DRM
client has the flexibility of choosing a distributor based on his
own preference. The DRM client may be mobile and roam
from one region to another. The DRM client may contact the
distributor who is nearest to his location for a digital asset.
2) We provide a secure and efficient key management
scheme in our proposed DRM system using IBE [30] instead
of certificate-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), coupling
it with Shamir’s [29] secret sharing scheme. IBE has the
property that a user’s public key is an easily calculated func-
tion of his identity, such as his email address, while a user’s
private key can be calculated for him by a trusted authority,
called Private Key Generator (PKG). The ID-based public key
cryptosystem simplifies certificate management and certificate
verification and is an alternative for certificate-based PKI, es-
pecially when efficient key management and moderate security
are required. We obtain efficiency gains in computation time
and storage over the existing certificate-based PKI approaches
as no certificate management and certificate verification are
needed by the entities in our DRM system.
3) In our key management mechanism, the package server
does not trust distribution servers or license server. The
symmetric decryption key used to encrypt a digital content
is delivered from the package server to the DRM client in
a secure manner and it is protected it from its generation
to consumption. Unlike the current DRM system which has
focused on content protection from purchasers, our scheme
protects the key not only from the purchasers, but also from
other principals such as the distribution servers and the license
server. Consequently, the encrypted digital content sent by a
package server can only be decrypted by the DRM client who
has a valid license and no one else.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the notations and terminologies used throughout the
paper and briefly introduces the preliminaries on DRM sys-
tems, identity-based cryptography and digital signatures. In
Section III, we propose our DRM model and key distribution
scheme. The security analysis is provided in Section IV.
Finally, we conclude in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. A Typical DRM System
Despite different DRM vendors have different DRM imple-
mentations, names and ways to specify the content usage rules,
the basic DRM process is the same. The entities involved in a
DRM system are a package server, distribution server, license
server and DRM client [22], [18]. In this model, a purchaser is
not a service provider, he simply pays a fee to the DRM client
and watches a movie or listen to a song. Figure 1 displays the
service/payment flow of a DRM system based on most existing
commercial systems.
• Package server: The package server holds the digital
rights of the content and wants to protect these rights. The
package server is concerned about unauthorized usage (such
as play, copy etc. without having permissions to perform)
and illegal redistribution of contents. The package server’s
concern about unauthorized use of content is resolved by
encrypting the content with the package server’s own secret
key. Digital contents have large volume and symmetric key is
usually used to encrypt them as symmetric encryption provides
high performance for consumption. For each digital content,
a different symmetric key is used.
The package server’s encryption key should not be disclosed
to any party other than those who have the corresponding
license (rights). The package server provides to the distribution
server the encrypted content and content information (right
metadata for the content promotion such as information to
play the content, information about the compression algorithm
etc.) The package server sends to the license server the
encryption information such as the seed of the encryption key,
the encryption length etc.
• Distribution server: The distribution server provides
distribution channel such as online shop or a web retailer. The
distribution server has a media server and sets up a website
presenting the protected content and content information that
he receives from the package server. A purchaser can select
a content from the distribution server’s website and download
the encrypted content from its media server. Purchaser will be
able to decrypt the content if it purchases the corresponding
license from the DRM client which is issued to the DRM client
by the license server.
• License server: The license server issues license to the
DRM client when instructed by the distribution server. Digital
licenses contain different permissions and usage rules such as
frequency of access, expiration date, restriction of transfer to
other devices, copy permission etc. Licence can be delivered
to the requesting application prior to or at the same time
as the transfer of digital content. Usually an e-commerce is
integrated with a DRM system in handling financial payments
and triggering the function of licence server. The license server
handles the financial transactions for issuing the digital license
to the DRM client, pays royalty fees to the package server and
distribution fees to the distribution server accordingly. In this
paper, we will not discuss the financial payment handling.
Moreover the license server is responsible to detect (or
prevent) any unauthorized use due to system violation and
take legal action against the DRM client. An effective method
to detect unauthorized use due to system violation is by using
log files that reflect actual activities of the DRM clients. Usage
logs should be created at DRM client’s machine and license
server is responsible to collect and audit these logs and take
necessary action if system violation is detected. We refer
to [14], [28], [26] for more details on issues related to use of
audit logs for detection/prevention of system violation. Digital
watermarking [8], [9], [31], [24], tamper resistance [5], [27],
[6], [1] are other means to detect system violation. We will
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not describe the details here due to space consideration and
concentrate mainly on key management among the different
components of a DRM system.
• DRM client: The DRM client selects a content from
the distribution server’s web catalogue, uses the system to
consume encrypted content by retrieving downloadable or
streaming content through the distribution channel and then
paying for the license. The DRM client analyzes the license
(in which the decryption key is embedded) and decrypts the
content. The DRM client provides service to the purchasers
and purchasers are concerned about ease of getting content,
ease of usage of content and their own privacy.
The following notations are used throughout the paper.
P package server
Di i-th distribution server
L license server
C DRM client
IDU public identity of user U
SIDU private key of user U
PKG private key generator
Enc ID-based asymmetric encryption algorithm
Dec decryption algorithm corresponding to Enc
Sig signature generation algorithm
Ver signature verification algorithm
MK master key of PKG
Ppub public key of PKG
A|B concatenation of A and B
B. Certificate-Based Vs. Identity-Based Cryptography
The certificate-based protocols work by assuming that each
entity has a static (long term) public/private key pair, and
each entity knows the public key of each other entity. The
static public keys are authenticated via certificates issued by a
certifying authority (CA) by binding users’ identities to static
keys. When two entities wish to establish a session key, a pair
of ephemeral (short term) public keys are exchanged between
them. The ephemeral and static keys are then combined in a
way so as to obtain the agreed session key. The authenticity of
the static keys provided by signature of CA assures that only
the entities who posses the static keys are able to compute the
session key. Thus the problem of authenticating the session key
is replaced by the problem of authenticating the static public
keys which is solved by using CA, a traditional approach based
on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
However, in a certificate-based system, the participants must
first verify the certificate of the user before using the public
key of the user. Consequently, the system requires a large
amount of computing time and storage.
In identity-based public key encryption, the public key
distribution problem is eliminated by making each user’s
public key derivable from some known aspect of his identity,
such as his email address. When Alice wants to send a message
to Bob, she simply encrypts her message using Bob’s public
key which she derives from Bob’s identifying information.
Bob, after receiving the encrypted message, obtains his private
key from a third party called a Private Key Generator (PKG),
after authenticating himself to PKG and can then decrypt the
message. The private key that PKG generates on Bob’s query
is a function of its master key and Bob’s identity.
Shamir [30] introduced this concept of identity-based
cryptosystem to simplify key management procedures in
certificate-based public key infrastructure. The first ID-Based
Encryption (IBE) was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [3] in
2001 that uses bilinear pairing. Shortly after this, many ID-
based cryptographic protocols were developed (see [10] for a
survey) based on pairings and is currently a very active area
of research.The ID-based public key cryptosystem can be an
alternative for certificate-based PKI, especially when efficient
key management and moderate security are required.
The advantage of ID-based encryption are compelling. It
makes maintaining authenticated public key directories unnec-
essary. Instead, a directory for authenticated public parameters
of PKGs is required which is less burdensome than maintain-
ing a public key directory since there are substantially fewer
PKGs than total users. In particular, if everyone uses a single
PKG, then everyone in the system can communicate securely
and users need not to perform on-line lookup of public keys
or public parameters.
In an ID-based encryption scheme there are four algorithms.
1) Setup : Creates system parameters and master key.
2) Extract : Uses master key to generate the private key
corresponding to an arbitrary public key string ID.
3) Encrypt : Encrypts messages using the public key ID.
4) Decrypt : Decrypts the message using the corresponding
private key of ID.
C. Digital Signature
Digital signatures are one of the most important crypto-
graphic primitives. In traditional public key signature algo-
rithms, the binding between the public key and the identity of
the signer is obtained via a digital certificate. Shamir [30] first
noticed that it would be more efficient if there was no need for
such bindings, in that case given the user’s identity, the public
key could be easily derived using some public deterministic
algorithm. This makes efficient ID-based signature schemes
desirable. In ID-based signature schemes, verification function
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Fig. 2. Asymmetric key distribution: PKG issues private keys for package server P
and distribution servers D1, . . . , Dn , whereas package server P issues private key for
DRM client C
is easily obtained from the identity, possibly the same key
and the same underlying computation primitives can be used.
Shamir gave a practical ID-based signature scheme.
A standard digital signature scheme (KeyGen, Sig,Ver) con-
sists of three algorithms.
1) KeyGen : the key generation algorithm that generates
randomly public system parameters params and pub-
lic/secret key pair PK, SK of a signer.
2) Sig : signature generation algorithm that generates a
signature on a given message m using the secret key
SK of a signer.
3) Ver : signature verification algorithm that checks the
validity of a signature on a given message using the
public key of a signer and returns true or false as the
case may be.
For ID-based signature, a signer’s public key PK is its public
identity and secret key SK is the key that the signer obtains
by extract query on its identity to PKG.
III. PROPOSED KEY DISTRIBUTION
A. Asymmetric Key Distribution
The commonly used cryptographic primitives in DRM
systems are symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital
signatures, one way hash functions, digital certificates etc.
To mitigate the bandwidth overhead, among several asymmet-
ric (public) key cryptography one may adopt Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) [2] due to its acceptable overhead. The
signature scheme ECC-192 provides higher security level
than RSA-1024 while the length of its signature is 48 bytes
compared to 128 bytes of RSA-1024. In our asymmetric key
distribution, we use the setup of Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) instead of certificate-based setup to simplify certificate
management and certificate verification. A trusted PKG gen-
erates the private key of a server upon receiving its public
identity (which may be some known aspect of its identity, such
as its e-mail address or biometric). We use the private/public
key pair thus generated for each entity in the system as the
respective signing/verification key pair of the corresponding
entity.
In our DRM model, the package server P appoints n dis-
tribution servers D1, . . . , Dn in different regions to facilitate
the distribution process. The DRM client C is mobile and
moves from one region to another. C can download encrypted
contents from its preferred distributor, say Di, which might
be location wise nearest to C. The owner of the package
server P has raw content and wants to protect it. None of the
principals except P should know how to decrypt the content.
Our proposed key management scheme deals with the key
management among several components of a DRM system.
The main ideas are the followings:
• Symmetric encryption is used to encrypt digital content
by the package server P .
• Partial information of symmetric decryption keys are
delivered using asymmetric encryption and stored in different
servers in such a way that neither the distribution servers
D1, . . . , Dn nor the license server L can generate the decryp-
tion key.
• The components of a DRM system which have a content
decryption key are the package server P and the DRM client
C with a valid license.
It is very difficult to authenticate a purchaser. Purchases are
concerned about their privacy and anonymity. They simply
needs to pay a fee to watch a movie. Instead, the DRM
client C is a service provider to the purchaser and should
be authenticated by the owner of the package server P .
Figure 2 shows the key distribution of asymmetric keys which
are used to deliver symmetric decryption keys and mutually
authenticate the components of a DRM system.
The principals of the package server P , the distribution
servers D1, . . . , Dn and the license server L submit their
respective public identities to PKG and receive the corre-
sponding secret keys through a secure communication channel,
after PKG verifies the identities of the principals. PKG uses
its master key and received valid identity of a principal
to generate the principal’s corresponding private key. The
package server P plays the role of PKG for the DRM client C
and issues its private key in a secure manner after verifying the
public identity of C. i.e. P , D1, . . . , Dn and L make Extract
query on their respective identities to PKG, whereas C makes
Extract query on its identity to the package server P . P uses
its own private key issued by PKG to compute the private key
of the DRM client C corresponding to C’s public identity.
B. Key Delivery when Packaging
While packaging a digital content M , the package server P
uses a symmetric key K to encrypt M and delivers partial
information of K to the license server and n distribution
servers D1, . . . , Dn in the following manner. The service flow
is shown in Figure 3.
1)(a) P first chooses a polynomial f(x) ∈ Fq[x] of degree
t with K = f(0), where Fq is a finite field of a large prime
order q.
(b) P computes for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, YDi = EncIDDi (f(i))
using Di’s public identity IDDi , generates signature σYDi =
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S = {(xi, f(xi)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and x1, . . . , xn ∈ Z∗q \ {1, . . . , n} and Di is
the preferred distribution server (location wise nearest) to the DRM client C .
SigSIDP
(YDi ) using P ’s own private key SIDP and sends
YDi |σYDi to Di.(c) P chooses randomly t distinct elements x1, . . . , xt ∈
Z∗q \{1, . . . , n}. P computes YL = EncIDL(S) using L’s public
identity IDL where S = {(xi, f(xi)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}, signature
σYL = SigSIDP
(YL) using P ’s own private key SIDP , and sends
YL|σYL to L.
2)(a) For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Di on receiving YDi |σYDi , verifies
the signature σYDi on YDi using P ’s public identity IDP . If
verification succeeds, i.e. VerIDP (YDi , σYDi ) = true, then Di
decrypts YDi using its private key SIDDi , recovers f(i) =
DecSIDDi
(YDi ) and stores f(i) to its secure database.
(b) L upon receiving YL|σYL , verifies the signature σYL on
YL using P ’s public identity IDP . If verification succeeds, i.e.
VerIDP (YL, σYL) = true, then L decrypts YL using its private
key SIDL , recovers S = DecSIDL (YL), where S is the set of
points S = {(xi, f(xi)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and stores them to its
secure database.
C. Key Delivery when Content Service is Provided
When a DRM client C requests the content service for
encrypted content M from a distribution server, say Di, which
is within nearest reach to C, the following steps are executed.
Figure 3 displays the service flow.
1) Di computes YC = EncIDC (f(i)) using C’s public
identity IDC , signature σYC = SigSIDDi (YC) using Di’s own
private key SIDDi , and sends YC |σYC to L.
2) L on receiving YC |σYC , verifies the signature σYC on YC
using Di’s public identity IDDi . If verification succeeds, i.e.
VerIDDi (YC , σYC ) = true, L computes YL = EncIDC (S) using
C’s public identity IDC , signature σYC |YL = SigSIDL (YC |YL)
using L’s own private key SIDL , and issues the license that
contains YC |YL|σYC |YL together with rights, content URL, and
so forth.
3) The DRM client C analyzes the licence issued by
L, verifies σYC |YL on YC |YL using L’s public key IDL. If
verification succeeds, C decrypts YC and YL using its own
private key SIDC , and recovers f(i) = DecSIDC (YC) and
S = DecSIDC (YL) where S = {(xi, f(xi)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}.
C then interpolates with S and (i, f(i)) to recover K = f(0)
by Lagrange interpolation formula as follows:
f(0) =
t∑
l=0
Λlf(xl),
where
Λl =
t∏
k=0
k 6=l
−xk
xl − xk
with x0 = i. Finally, C decrypts the content using the
recovered symmetric key K and can view (play) M .
IV. SECURITY
The process of authentication or verification of the identities
of the parties is necessary in a DRM system to ensure that the
packaged digital content is from the genuine authorized con-
tent distributor. In our design, digital certificates are not used to
authenticate or verify the identity of the parties involved in the
system unlike certificate-based public key infrastructure, thus
saving large amount of computing time and storage. Instead,
we use IBE that simplifies our key management mechanism.
An attack on the (n+1) partial information of the symmetric
decryption key K (which is used in encryption for content
protection by the package server) during delivery from the
package server P to the distribution servers D1, . . . , Dn and
the license server L is prevented, because each piece of the
(n+ 1) partial information of K is encrypted under a public
key and delivered to a server who owns the matching private
key. Note that to recover the decryption key, one needs to know
(t + 1) points on the polynomial f(x). The (n + 1) partial
information of K are separated and stored at different servers
in such a way that, neither any of the distribution servers
D1, . . . , Dn nor the license server L has t + 1 points on the
polynomial f(x) to generate the decryption key K = f(0)
by itself. Hence the decryption key K is protected from an
attack on the distribution servers or the license server, since
the (n + 1) partial information of K is stored at different
servers so that each server knows insufficient points on the
polynomial f(x) to interpolate it and get the key K = f(0).
Moreover, since a distribution server encrypts its partial
information of K with the DRM client’s public key and sends
it to the license server, the license server cannot decrypt it and
consequently, cannot generate the decryption key K . License
server also encrypts its partial information of K using the
DRM client’s public key. Thus the partial information of
K can only be decrypted by the DRM client who has the
matching private key and no one else. The DRM client gets
(t + 1) points on the polynomial f(x) after decryption and
combine them to recover the key K = f(0) by Lagrange
interpolation.
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Our key management scheme enables the symmetric decryp-
tion key K to be protected from the principals who manages
the distribution servers and the license server. The digital
content can thus be protected from attacks during the content
distribution since the encrypted digital content is sent by the
package server and only the DRM client can decrypt the digital
content. Besides, we use IBE and digital signature instead of
digital certificates. This simplifies the process of authentication
or verification of the identities in the system.
We use digital signatures for non-repudiable rights issuing.
The license server digitally signs licenses of the digital content.
Consequently, the play application on the DRM client’s device
can verify the correctness of the usage rights and keep the
signature as a proof of rights purchase. One can combine
one-way hash functions such as HMAC-SHA1 [19] in the
DRM system with digital signature for integrity checking. The
license server uses its private key to sign the hash value of the
encrypted content rights. Integrity verification of the license
is through verifying the signature using the public key of the
license server and then comparing the hash value with a re-
computed hash value. Similar arguments hold for the other
servers (the package server and the distribution servers in the
system).
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a flexible and effective DRM
architecture with multi-distributors that facilitates client mo-
bility and an efficient key management mechanism in this
DRM system coupling IBE with Shamir’s secret sharing. Our
proposed DRM architecture provides scalability of business
model and allows to make proper business strategies for
different regions and cultures. The encrypted digital content
sent by a package server can only be decrypted by the DRM
client and is protected from attacks by other parties/servers
in our DRM system. Our key management protects the key
used to encrypt a digital content during its delivery from the
package server to the DRM client, not only from purchasers
but also from the distribution servers and the license server.
IBE enables us to obtain efficiency gains in computation time
and storage over the existing certificate-based PKI approaches
as no certificate management and certificate verification is
needed by the entities in our DRM system.
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